A Systems Approach to Nuclear Deterrence by john suter
A response to a new book “Rethinking a Political Approach to Nuclear Abolition” by Perkovich, Yoshida, Nishida
The nation-state does not make decisions. It is not a living being. In reality, a nation-state is a group of people within a geographic border with leaders who make critical decisions. Leaders who reflect on their use of language, stories, and metaphors will discover that the stories in their minds are highly influenced by their own circle of assistants along with the influence of lobbyists, family, friends, and colleagues. We make decisions as individuals but gather information and tell stories as groups. The story created includes what the world looks like, or should look like, and what the consequences might be if bad decisions are made. The chess board on the cover page of the book indicates that many leaders are led to believe they are grandmasters playing the game. In reality, they are part of the game too. This fact should be recognized and used to find solutions.
The rethinking considered in this paper may lead to reformulation of scenarios of a seemingly difficult problem, but does it bring in new ideas and new solutions? Solutions may start to appear depending on how the problem is set up. What are the assumptions? What questions are asked? What are the contingencies? Nuclear weapons experts unable to consider other questions or outside ideas will not be able to create a new future.
New Tools, New Situations, New Imagination
New factors in a different world must be recognized. New tools include new pathways of communication that include social media. World travel and cross-cultural mingling has also changed the game. Astronauts in the space station arrive there from a variety of countries and languages. A number of high government decision makers have dual citizenship with another country. Without arguing the pros and cons, this fact brings up the question of whether it may herald a new role in the evolution of the nation-state.
When a problem seems too complex it can be helpful to enlarge the problem. Complex systems must have feedback to function and to stay in balance. In the case of nuclear weapons, the system must be enlarged to include the whole world.
Thinking in systems can be very helpful in complex problems, allowing some people to focus on only a part of the system and then integrate that part with other parts. In many systems, control is determined by the feedback from a small sensor to a specific decision point or control valve. This is the target of the feedback. In the case of nuclear deterrence, the target is a specific Decision Maker who gives the command to launch a nuclear attack, but targeting the person would only happen after a nuclear weapon has been launched.
MAD deterrence has been the underpinning of the nuclear arms race. It makes sense that no political leader would make a decision that would eventually destroy their own country. MAD deterrence in a systems approach for nuclear deterrence is set to “take out” (whatever that means) a Decision Maker. To be a deterrent, however, the Decision Maker must know ahead of time what will happen to them. This is systems thinking that could save the system - i.e. the whole world.
But who or what is the sensor? In a balanced and stable system, feedback can come from sensors at several sites. In the nuclear control system, feedback could be from a Trio of Feedback Sensors, each one having at least one real person in a small group. These small sensor groups would be distributed geographically and located in any combination of nuclear nations and non-nuclear nations, of which there are more than 150. Even non-state actors can participate. These Trio-Feedback groups must create their own reliable communication methods and standards.
Time to Decision
Decisions to launch or not launch are coming under increasing pressure. One factor is simply the increasing number of countries building their own nuclear arsenal. Even more pressure comes from the improvements in missile technology, decreasing the time to make a decision to 10 minutes or less, a very short time to decide on the fate of the world. If there is a solid belief that an attack by an enemy is imminent, it may be smarter to strike first and to make that strike overwhelming. Defense becomes offense. Is this Orwellian – or is it common sense? Military leaders exist today who make the first strike argument.
Systems in Biological Models
A study of other systems could be helpful in designing a system for control of nuclear weapons worldwide. There are systems in biology, for example, that control the balance of several opposing factors without catastrophic results. The coagulation cascade that prevents blood loss in the human body is a marvel of design. It can activate or “turn on” many cells and tissues all at once (the cascade) yet prevent the process from going too far. And it can do all this within minutes. A hematologist making a presentation on this subject might also comment on the general command and control mechanisms of this system.
The Dark Suits – the Human Factor
Historically there have been presidents and their counterparts who have had the courage and creative thinking to broach the question of nuclear weapons: Reagan with Gorbachev in Helsinki, Trump with Kim Jong Un in Singapore. As reported by people in the room, the principles were on the same wavelength and got along fine. When the principles left the room, however, the Dark Suits entered and re-tied the Gordian Knot. It should be common knowledge that there are a significant number of clinically paranoid people among the Dark Suits. Without totally discounting their point of view, they should be challenged. Testing of their view with a Discovery Game can allow anonymity but retain the integrity of ideas.
Fear is a true motivator, and paranoid people tend to only look at power thru the barrel of a gun. We must be more creative in thinking about and using other types of power, including how to find and move useful information, a critical task when news outlets are unreliable. Circles of advisors have always had their own agenda but with a limited view. If the issue of nuclear weapons is not on the agenda of the Chief of Staff, it won’t be discussed. Leaders need better information, new ideas, and privacy of discussion away from their advisors.
While countries now might wish to prevent a catastrophic nuclear exchange with their adversary, it is obvious that each continues to engage in many subtle and indirect ways to destroy their opponent. In so doing, they continue to build enmity.
There are ways to set up competition in more constructive ways and with a positive twist. China is tied to a concept of their own making called “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR). Using that same metaphor for leverage, it might be possible to “Break the Belt” by focusing on a few Links within that belt and make those countries (the Links) self-sustaining enough so that they do not need China. Pushing the Link country uphill toward success rapidly would be essential, something the US might have to practice. This process could be made into a competition and a challenge to many parts of society besides the military.
Grass Roots Groups as Monitors
What if we get to zero? How would that maintained? One possibility could be to engage a group of 100 citizens in a specific geographic area, or with a specific politician to monitor. If any rumors about new nuclear facilities arise, these citizens drop everything to “check it out” and force an answer. This requires communication and information filtering that is robust, plus a way to organize their neighborhoods to pick up the slack from their regular jobs. This is a systems approach that engages people as sensors, not as consumers.
Other groups can play with hypothetical situations on almost any issue, but these should be limited in time and limited in number of people to make it efficient. Some of this could be made into a game in the same way that military planners play war games.
Several smaller nations are now starting a process that will give them a “latent” possibility to build their own nuclear weapons. This is essentially useless since an all-out war will be over within a day if not within hours. They would do better to invest in conventional military readiness which could, in reality, play a big role in limited nuclear exchanges. Or these countries might invest in the formation of Trio-Feedback groups.